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Introduction
Coined by Schelling (1960) , the term strategic delegation refers to a situation where a player uses a delegate as a \commitment device." In closely related models, Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) , and Vickers (1985) (henceforth FJSV), have formally shown how strategic delegation may serve as such a commitment device in oligopoly.
Delegation of this type has received considerable attention in the theory of markets with separation of decision making and ownership. This paper provides an experimental investigation into the matter.
Consider a simple Cournot duopoly and imagine one¯rm employs a delegate to decide upon its supply while the other does not. In that case, the¯rst¯rm can, by choosing an appropriate incentive contract for its manager, induce a Stackelberg outcome. 1 This increases the¯rst¯rm's equilibrium pro¯ts. As FJSV have shown, markets become more competitive when¯rms use delegates whose incentives can depend on pro¯ts and sales. If both¯rms employ managers, they will choose equilibrium contracts with a sales bonus, inducing quantities that exceed the Cournot equilibrium quantities (which result if both¯rms take their decisions without delegates). Hence, rms' pro¯ts decrease. Firms face a dilemma situation.
The literature following FJSV has shown that the observability of contracts may be crucial for the results. Katz (1991) argues that unobservable contracts have no commitment value at all. 2 In contrast to that, Fershtman and Kalai (1997) analyze the conditions under which delegation, even when unobservable, may a®ect the outcome of an ultimatum game. In a recent experiment, these results were experimentally tested by Fershtman and Gneezy (1999) . They show that unobservable delegation indeed matters|even if theory does not predict an e®ect of delegation. The main insight of Fershtman and Gneezy's study is that because of the introduction of a third player (the delegate) the ultimatum game is perceived more competitive which may drive behavior closer to the game{theoretic prediction. 1 Technically speaking, the¯rst¯rm can arbitrarily manipulate its manager's response function.
Thus, it can \select" any quantity combination which lies on the second¯rm's response function.
2 Bagwell (1995) shows that any noise associated with the observation of the¯rst mover's choice (in a sequential game) eliminates the¯rst{mover advantage. See Huck and MÄ uller (2000) for experimental evidence.
In this paper, we report results from an experiment designed to test the FJSV prediction for markets. We study a simple Cournot duopoly framework matching the requirements of the FJSV theory. The main question is whether¯rm owners indeed provide contracts with sales bonuses, making their managers more \aggressive" and, thus, rendering the market outcomes more competitive. 3 In the experiment each¯rm has one owner and one manager. Owners simultaneously choose between two di®erent contracts which determine their managers' possible salaries. One contract induces managers to maximize pro¯ts, while with the second contract managers' salaries are a convex combination of pro¯ts and sales. The chosen contracts become public information. Then managers simultaneously decide about quantities. Markets are repeated and an owner{manager pair always stays together.
This basic setup is varied in three treatments. All treatments implement \15 years" of market interaction. In two treatments, each year consists of four \quarters." While in these treatments owners only decide once a year about the contract, the managers have to make their choice in every quarter. This gives managers time for learning in the reached subgames. These two treatments di®er with respect to the matching between rms. In one treatment two¯rms interact repeatedly over the complete course of the experiment. In the other treatment,¯rms are randomly rematched at the beginning of each year, but they stay together for four quarters. The third treatment di®ers from the¯rst two in that there are no quarters. Here¯rms are also randomly rematched every year.
The theoretical prediction is identical for all these treatments: Owners should choose the contract entailing sales bonuses, and managers should, accordingly, produce above the Cournot level. The surprising result is, however, that owners rarely choose the equilibrium contract. Moreover, it turns out that|given managers' behavior in asymmetric subgames, i.e., in subgames in which they have di®erent contracts|these choices are rational.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the underlying theory and the experimental design, Section 3 reports the experimental results, and Section 4 concludes.
Theory and Experimental Design
In line with the FJSV model, we use linear demand and cost functions for our experiment. More speci¯cally, inverse demand was
where q i ; i = 1; 2; denotes¯rm i's output. In order to avoid negative pro¯ts, we set constant marginal cost equal to zero. Manager i's incentives, g i ; are a combination of pro¯ts and sales: 4
Straightforward computation shows that manager i chooses in equilibrium
Owners simultaneously decide about¸1 and¸2. Their objective is to maximize pro¯ts pq i . Again it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium actions. Owners choosȩ
which induces q ¤ 1 = q ¤ 2 = 24. By contrast, if owners choose¸1 =¸2 = 0, both managers produce q 1 = q 2 = 20 (the Cournot quantities of the duopoly without delegation).
In an experimental market, strategic delegation is presumably of considerable complexity. For every (¸1;¸2){combination, there is a di®erent subgame with di®erent equilibrium outputs in those subgames. Generally, subjects in multi{stage experiments do not play the subgame perfect equilibrium very well (see, for example, the literature on the ultimatum game which Fershtman and Gneezy (1999) study). Therefore, we simpli¯ed the design as far as possible.
We restricted the owners' strategy sets to only two choices which we labelled \Contract A" and \Contract B". Contract A corresponds to¸i = 0, while Contract B corresponds to¸i = 12; the equilibrium contract. In order to avoid a possible bias because of the labels \A" and \B", in¯ve out of twelve sessions the labelling was reversed such that the equilibrium contract was Contract A. Since there were no signi¯cant differences between those treatments, we pooled the data and will henceforth refer to the equilibrium contract as Contract B.
We also restricted managers' strategy sets. More precisely, we let them choose from the set of quantities which are optimal in the four unrestricted quantity subgames. As noted above, if both owners choose Contract A, i.e., if¸1 =¸2 = 0, both managers optimally choose q 1 = q 2 = 20. If both owners choose Contract B, i.e.,¸1 =¸2 = 12, managers' optimal choice is q 1 = q 2 = 24. Finally, the asymmetric Contract A/Contract B outcome with¸i = 12 and¸j = 0, leads to q i = 28 and q j = 16. Therefore, managers' strategy set was f16; 20; 24; 28g.
This reduced game was presented to subjects by payo® tables rather than by the model's parameters and payo® functions. 5 The payo® matrices are reproduced in Tables 1{3. They are, in principle, derived from the above linear model (see Appendix B). Analyzing these tables also shows that the game can be solved by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. For reasons of plausibility of the frame, owners' pro¯ts and managers' salaries were of di®erent magnitudes. In order to equalize average payments of owners and managers, we used di®erent exchange rates when converting the experimental payments into Deutsche marks (see below). Table 3 results. A¯fth table given to subjects (not reproduced here) gave the payo®s in case the¯rst manager had Contract B and the second manager had Contract A. This table is somewhat redundant but it might have helped subjects understanding the game. All ve tables were given to all subjects before they knew which role they would play. 5 Since the size of the quantities f16; 20; 24; 28g is entirely meaningless to subjects (recall that they did not know the model), we labelled the strategies f1; 2; 3; 4g instead. However, since the reader is familiar with the model and the equilibrium values, we will refer to quantities f16; 20; 24; 28g throughout the paper. For all treatments, we conducted three sessions with eight subjects participating in each session. In treatments with random matching, all eight participants interacted;
with¯xed matching, two groups of four subjects interacted but subjects could not tell with whom they were matched. 
Experimental Results
We will¯rst present the contract choices of owners. Afterwards, we will analyze quantity choices of managers. Together with an analysis of ex{post realized payo®s for¯rm owners, this will yield an overall interpretation of the results.
Choice of contracts (1st stage). Recall that theory predicts¯rm owners to choose the contract that induces managers to care not only for¯rm pro¯ts but also for sales.
That is, theoretically we would expect owners to choose Contract B, or at least learn to do so over time. Contrary to this prediction, we observe that in all three treatments the equilibrium Contract B is only rarely chosen. Out of 180 cases each, the number of Contract{B choices is 32 (17.8%), 29 (16.1%) and 48 (26.7%) in treatments FixFour, RandFour and RandOne, respectively. The data clearly do not support the theory.
A binomial test even rejects the hypothesis that contracts are chosen equiprobably, that is, the hypothesis that Contract B is chosen with a probability of p = 0:5 is rejected. 7 7 We conducted two tests. For the¯rst, we counted each contract choice as one observation. This test rejects the hypothesis at the 1% level. Since observations for individual owners might not be independent, we conducted a second test, in which we counted each owner as one observation: A dummy variable was 0 or 1 depending on whether the owner had a majority of A or B contracts. Using these data we can reject the hypothesis at the 5% level. Table 5 shows for each subgame both the theoretically predicted and the observed average industry output for all treatments. For the asymmetric subgames with di®erent contracts, Table   5 also shows average individual quantities. Due to the behavior in the¯rst stage, the majority of observations is made after both owners choose Contract A.
Inspecting Table 5 we observe that theory predicts average industry output quite well. Consider¯rst symmetric subgames: In subgame A/A, FixFour and RandFour are somewhat collusive, while RandOne is slightly more competitive than predicted.
In subgame B/B, average industry output is in all treatments larger than predicted, (FixFour vs. RandOne), and p = :319 (RandFour vs. RandOne).
but the predicted output is still within one standard deviation of the actual mean (note that we only have a few observations here). Note that in theory the (truncated) owner game is a prisoners' dilemma with Contract B being the dominant strategy. But, due to the observed behavior of managers in the experiment, entirely di®erent payo® matrices emerge for owners: Given actual quantity choices in the subgames, Contract A becomes the dominant strategy in all treatments. The dilemma structure of the owner game disappears when managers' 11 Signi¯cance levels of a two{tailed paired{sample T test were p = :000 for treatment RandFour and p = :117 for treatment FixFour. 12 To construct these matrices, we computed average earnings of owners resulting from play in the sub- actual behavior is taken into account. 13 As it is evident from Figure 1 , owners start with a high proportion of contract This, however, raises the question whether one would observe the same failure of theory in asymmetric markets where inequality is unavoidable due to di®erent cost conditions. Possibly, a design with asymmetric¯rms could provide more favorable conditions for the theory of strategic delegation to prove successful. 16 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated strategic delegation in a homogenous{goods duopoly experiment according to the models of Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) , and Vickers (1985) (FJSV). While the theoretical literature has pointed out that the FJSV prediction depends on intricate details of the model (the mode of competition, the observability of contracts, uncertainty, risk aversion, etc.), our results show that there is a weak point inherent even in the standard FJSV model. The prediction depends on subgame{perfect behavior of managers. In our experiment, managers did 13 Note that the non{equilibrium contract, A, is in all treatments chosen with a relative frequency of more than 50% in almost all rounds. (The only exception is round 3 of treatment RandFour.
See Appendix C.) Compared to standard 2 £ 2 prisoners' dilemma experiments (see e.g. Cooper et al., 1996) , we observe that owners in our experiment choose the cooperative strategy much more frequently. 14 
B How the payo® tables were derived
Deriving the payo® tables we had to face a number of conceptual problems. In theory, only managers' relative incentives (g i ) are important while absolute payments to managers are¯xed and, therefore, do not a®ect equilibrium outcomes. The reason for this is that, assuming a competitive labor market for managers, managers will simply receive their reservation wage. Given standard rationality assumptions,¯rm owners and managers can rely on the equilibrium prediction and contracts can be adjusted accordingly|regardless of the relative incentives they provide. In an experiment this does not work as the equilibrium prediction may be violated. Hence,¯rm owners' payments to managers would become variable. And this, in turn, would change the equilibrium prediction. In order to reconcile the experiment with the FJSV theory, we decided to let owners' pro¯ts to be independent of the payments to managers. In other words, as in theory, owners' pro¯ts do not directly depend on the contracts they give to their managers, but only on the (induced) quantities the managers choose. For a particular combination of outputs, managers' salaries may di®er depending on their contracts, while owners' pro¯ts are the same. 17
The second problem is that Cournot games in matrix form exhibit multiple equilibria (Holt, 1985) . In order to get unique best replies and to make the numbers more easily accessible for subjects, we slightly manipulated owners' payo®s which, in principle, 17 In case a subject asked why owners get equal pro¯ts though managers' salaries di®er, we were prepared to explain that managers' salaries were only a very small fraction of the¯rms' pro¯t, not a®ecting the pro¯ts written down in the payo® matrix. No subject ever asked such a question.
were derived from ¦ i = max f60 ¡ q 1 ¡ q 2 ; 0g q i ; with q 1 ; q 2 2 f16; 20; 24; 28g. More speci¯cally, we¯rst rounded all entries to a multiple of 10, and then 2 £ 4 = 8 entries of Table 1 were changed to lower or higher multiples of ten to get unique best replies. Now turn to the managers' payo® tables. The matrix shown in Table 2 (left) is simply derived by multiplying (non-rounded) owner pro¯ts with 0:13 and then rounding the resulting values to integers.
If owners choose the contract with bonus, Contract B, another problem arises. If managers simply got the above share of pro¯ts plus a payment for sales, payments under the equilibrium contract would be always higher. Since owners' pro¯ts are independent of managers' salaries, owners might simply choose an equilibrium contract because their managers earn more. For this reason, we implicitly introduced a negative¯xed payment as part of Contract B. This negative¯xed payment was such that average payments with Contract B were just as high as with Contract A. Comparing the two payo® matrices in Table 2 , the reader will realize that, when quantities 16 and 20 are chosen, payments are c.p. lower with Contract B, and, when quantities 24 and 28 are chosen, payments are c.p. higher with Contract B. That is, when q i 2 f16; 20g there is actually a malus for too few sales, and when q i 2 f24; 28g there is a bonus for larger sales. The functional form for the bonus is (12q i ¡ 264) £ 0:13; q i 2 f16; 20; 24; 28g:
This explains how the matrices in Table 2 (right) and in Table 3 were derived. FixFour 8 9 9 10 8 10 11 11 9 10 11 11 10 10 11
C Further Data
RandFour 9 8 5 9 10 9 10 11 10 10 12 12 12 12 12
RandOne 11 9 9 7 10 11 9 7 10 9 9 7 7 9 8 
